Cuban Missile Crisis - Wikipedia
The Cuban Missile Crisis, also known as the October Crisis of (Spanish: "This is a pretty good play of his," Kennedy said, according to a tape recording that he made secretly of the Cabinet Room meeting. Oct 14, The Cuban Missile Crisis: 13 days that almost ended the world 18 October Kennedy meeting with the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October was a direct and dangerous confrontation With no apparent end to the crisis in sight, U.S. forces were placed at Attorney General Robert Kennedy then met secretly with Soviet Ambassador to the.
An attempt by the Soviets to breach the blockade would likely have sparked a military confrontation that could have quickly escalated to a nuclear exchange. But the Soviet ships stopped short of the blockade.
The Cuban Missile Crisis comes to an end
Although the events at sea offered a positive sign that war could be averted, they did nothing to address the problem of the missiles already in Cuba.
The tense standoff between the superpowers continued through the week, and on October 27, an American reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba, and a U. The year-old pilot of the downed plane, Major Rudolf Anderson, is considered the sole U. During the crisis, the Americans and Soviets had exchanged letters and other communications, and on October 26, Khrushchev sent a message to Kennedy in which he offered to remove the Cuban missiles in exchange for a promise by U.
The following day, the Soviet leader sent a letter proposing that the USSR would dismantle its missiles in Cuba if the Americans removed their missile installations in Turkey. Officially, the Kennedy administration decided to accept the terms of the first message and ignore the second Khrushchev letter entirely.
Attorney General Robert Kennedy personally delivered the message to the Soviet ambassador in Washingtonand on October 28, the crisis drew to a close. The Cold War was far from over, though. In fact, another legacy of the crisis was that it convinced the Soviets to increase their investment in an arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the U. Nevertheless, during October 24 and 25, some ships turned back from the quarantine line; others were stopped by U. With no apparent end to the crisis in sight, U.
On October 26, Kennedy told his advisors it appeared that only a U. The crisis had reached a virtual stalemate. That afternoon, however, the crisis took a dramatic turn.
The Cuban Missile Crisis comes to an end - HISTORY
ABC News correspondent John Scali reported to the White House that he had been approached by a Soviet agent suggesting that an agreement could be reached in which the Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba if the United States promised not to invade the island. It was a long, emotional message that raised the specter of nuclear holocaust, and presented a proposed resolution that remarkably resembled what Scali reported earlier that day. We are ready for this.
The next day, October 27, Khrushchev sent another message indicating that any proposed deal must include the removal of U. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. That same day a U. He charged the Kennedy administration of covering up a major threat to the US, thereby starting the crisis. The R was a medium-range ballistic missile, capable of carrying a thermonuclear warhead.
I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would have preferred not to acquire, and which we do not wish to employ. The planned arsenal was forty launchers. The Cuban populace readily noticed the arrival and deployment of the missiles and hundreds of reports reached Miami.
US intelligence received countless reports, many of dubious quality or even laughable, most of which could be dismissed as describing defensive missiles. Only five reports bothered the analysts. They described large trucks passing through towns at night that were carrying very long canvas-covered cylindrical objects that could not make turns through towns without backing up and maneuvering.
Defensive missiles could turn.
The reports could not be satisfactorily dismissed. The Soviets lodged a protest and the US apologized.
The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962
Nine days later, a Taiwanese -operated U-2   was lost over western China to an SA-2 surface-to-air missile. The resulting lack of coverage over the island for the next five weeks became known to historians as the "Photo Gap.
US officials attempted to use a Corona photoreconnaissance satellite to obtain coverage over reported Soviet military deployments, but imagery acquired over western Cuba by a Corona KH-4 mission on October 1 was heavily covered by clouds and haze and failed to provide any usable intelligence.
When the reconnaissance missions were reauthorized on October 9, poor weather kept the planes from flying. Although he provided no direct reports of the Soviet missile deployments to Cuba, technical and doctrinal details of Soviet missile regiments that had been provided by Penkovsky in the months and years prior to the Crisis helped NPIC analysts correctly identify the missiles on U-2 imagery. McNamara was briefed at midnight.
The next morning, Bundy met with Kennedy and showed him the U-2 photographs and briefed him on the CIA's analysis of the images. Stern, head of the Kennedy library transcribed some of them. The US had no plan in place because its intelligence had been convinced that the Soviets would never install nuclear missiles in Cuba.
Johnson was a member, quickly discussed several possible courses of action: American vulnerability to Soviet missiles was not new. Use diplomatic pressure to get the Soviet Union to remove the missiles. Offer Castro the choice of splitting with the Russians or being invaded.
Full force invasion of Cuba and overthrow of Castro. Use the US Air Force to attack all known missile sites. Use the US Navy to block any missiles from arriving in Cuba.
As the article describes, both the US and the Soviet Union considered many possible outcomes of their actions and threats during the crisis Allison, Graham T. This game tree models how both actors would have considered their decisions. It is broken down into a simple form for basic understanding. The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously agreed that a full-scale attack and invasion was the only solution.
They believed that the Soviets would not attempt to stop the US from conquering Cuba.The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)
They, no more than we, can let these things go by without doing something. They can't, after all their statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do nothing.
If they don't take action in Cuba, they certainly will in Berlin. Kennedy also believed that US allies would think of the country as "trigger-happy cowboys" who lost Berlin because they could not peacefully resolve the Cuban situation.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the missiles would seriously alter the military balance, but McNamara disagreed. An extra 40, he reasoned, would make little difference to the overall strategic balance. The US already had approximately 5, strategic warheads, : McNamara concluded that the Soviets having would not therefore substantially alter the strategic balance.
Inhe reiterated that "it made no difference The military balance wasn't changed.